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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES - GENERAL
Case No. CV 21-7145-GW-JEMx Date November 22, 2021
Title Genevieve Morton v. Twitter, Inc., et al.
Present: The Honorable GEORGE H. WU, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Javier Gonzalez Terri A. Hourigan
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder Tape No.
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendants:
Jennifer Holliday Eve A. Zelinger
PROCEEDINGS: TELEPHONIC HEARING ON TWITTER DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
TO DISMISS [24]
The Court’s Tentative Ruling is circulated and attached hereto. Court hears oral argument. The parties
are to meet and confer, and attempt to resolve some or all of the motion to dismiss. If resolution is not
reached, Plaintiff will have until November 29, 2021 to file an opposition. Defendants will reply by
December 15, 2021. The Court continues the Motion to December 30, 2021 at 8:30 a.m.
Plaintiff’s Application for Entry of Default [83, 85], and Motion for Default Judgment [84], in CV 20-
10434, are vacated and taken off-calendar.
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Genevieve Morton v. Twitter, Inc. et al; Case No. 2:21-cv-07145-GW-(JEMx);  
Genevieve Morton v. Twitter, Inc. et al; Case No. 2:20-cv-10434-GW-(JEMx);  
Tentative Rulings on: (1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 24) (21-cv-07145); and (2) 
Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment (ECF No. 84) (20-cv-10434). 
   
 
I. Background 
Plaintiff Genevieve Morton brought this copyright infringement and privacy action 
against Defendants Twitter, Inc.; Magic Pony Technology, Inc; Tweetdeck, Inc.; and Twitter 
International Company after she discovered unauthorized, nude photographs of herself on the 
Twitter platform.  See Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 13-47, ECF No. 1.  This is the second action 
brought by Plaintiff against Twitter and related entities concerning the unauthorized posting of 
Plaintiff’s photos on Twitter by third-party users.   
Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss.  See Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 
(“Mot.”), ECF No. 24.  Instead of filing an Opposition, Plaintiff has moved for default judgment 
against Twitter in the related, consolidated action, Genevieve Morton v. Twitter, Inc. et al., Case 
No. 2:20-cv-10434-GW-(JEMx), Motion for Default Judgment (“Default”), ECF No. 84.  
Defendants have filed a Reply, see ECF No. 26. 
A. Procedural Background 
Plaintiff Morton first filed an action against Defendant Twitter, Inc. and SpyIRL.com in 
November 2020, accusing SpyIRL.com of posting unauthorized images of Plaintiff on the 
Twitter platform to promote and sell pornography.  See Genevieve Morton v. Twitter, Inc. et al., 
Case No. 2:20-cv-10434-GW-(JEMx) (“Morton I”), ECF No. 2.  Defendant Twitter moved to 
dismiss all of the claims except for the copyright infringement claim based on Section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), see ECF No. 19, and the Court granted Twitter’s 
motion.  See Morton I, ECF No. 30.  The parties then submitted a Joint Rule 26(f) Report, see 
Morton I, ECF No. 27, and the Court issued a scheduling order, see Morton I, ECF No 30, 
setting a discovery cutoff for October 15, 2021.   
In September 2021, Plaintiff Morton filed the instant action against Defendant Twitter, 
Inc. and other affiliates, Twitter International Company; Tweetdeck, Inc.; and Magic Pony 
Technology, Inc, regarding the posting of unauthorized images of Plaintiff on the Twitter 
platform by a third-party user, “@city_tits.”  See Compl. ¶¶ 20-27.  This Court consolidated the 
two actions, see ECF No. 21, and set a new scheduling order for the consolidated cases, see ECF 
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No. 22.  In the scheduling order, the Court directed all counsel to make future filings in Morton I, 
which was to serve as the lead case.  Id.   
Defendants submitted a motion to dismiss in the instant action, aiming to dismiss 
Defendant Twitter International Company for lack of personal jurisdiction; dismissing all causes 
of action against Defendants Twitter International Company, Tweetdeck, Inc.; and Magic Pony 
Technology, Inc. for failure to state a claim; and dismissing the cause of action for false light as 
barred by Section 230 of the CDA.  See generally Mot.  Plaintiff, citing the instruction in the 
Court’s scheduling order to make all future filings in Morton I, chose not to file an Opposition to 
the motion to dismiss in the instant action and instead filed a motion for default judgment in 
Morton I.  Defendants submitted their Reply, asserting that Plaintiff’s failure to provide an 
Opposition should be deemed consent to the granting or denial of the motion.  See C.D. Cal. L. 
Civ. R. 7-12; Reply at 1.   
II. Discussion 
This procedural issue should have been resolved by the parties before requiring the 
Court’s intervention.  Currently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss in the instant 
case and Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment in Morton I.  There is no opposition filed, 
resulting in an unacceptable waste of the Court’s time and resources.  
To start, Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is denied because it is clear that 
Defendants are not in default.  At most, Defendants erred by electing to file their motion to 
dismiss in the instant action following the Court’s instruction to file all future filings in Morton I, 
see ECF No. 22.1  Once Plaintiff discovered that Defendants had mistakenly filed the motion to 
dismiss on the wrong docket, Plaintiff could have met and conferred with Defendants and asked 
them to remedy the procedural snafu while proceeding to file her Opposition.  Instead, Plaintiff 
drafted and filed a substantive motion for default judgment, including a full analysis of the Eitel 
factors that, shockingly, concluded that a default judgment granting Plaintiff over $10 million 
dollars was appropriate based on Twitter’s procedural error.  See Default at 15-25.  Furthermore, 
Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) by refusing to serve 
Defendants with written notice of the application when Defendants have undoubtedly made an 
appearance through their representatives in this action.  The Court therefore finds default 
 
1 Defendants explain that they filed the motion to dismiss in the docket for the instant case because ECF 
functionality requires that motions to dismiss be linked to the previously filed document to which they relate, which 
was the Complaint in the instant docket.  See Reply at 2 n.2.    
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judgment inappropriate and inapplicable as Defendants are actively defending this action.   
Regarding the pending motion to dismiss, the Court is unclear how this situation could 
have arisen if the parties had complied with the meet and confer requirements of Local Rule 7-3, 
which requires the parties to “thoroughly” discuss the substance of any contemplated motion and 
any potential resolution.  Defendants claim that they reached out to Plaintiff’s counsel to request 
a meet and confer on three separate occassions, on October 11, 12, and 13, but Plaintiff’s counsel 
never responded.  See Declaration of Rebecca E. Davis ¶¶ 1-5.  Plaintiff’s counsel does not 
provide a declaration but asserts that Defendants “did not observe Local Rule 7-3 in conducting a 
meet and confer in advance of the deadline yet capriciously filed a Partial Motion to Dismiss 
without concurrently filing an Answer.”2  See Mot. at 12.  Plaintiff’s counsel’s story is 
inconsistent, however, because in other parts of briefing she states that she asked Defendants to 
schedule a meeting as early as mid-September, but asserts that “Defendants did not respond or 
suggest the required Local Rule 7-3 meeting until the middle of the day of the deadline on 
October 11.”  See id. at 9.  The Court notes that the deadline to answer was October 18, not 
October 11, so Defendants were in compliance with Local Rule 7-3 by requesting a meet and 
confer on October 11, one week in advance of the hearing.  The Court therefore cannot 
understand Plaintiff’s counsel’s justification for refusing to meet and confer.3  See ECF No. 22.          
The behavior of Plaintiff’s counsel in failing to comply with Local Rule 7-3 or Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 55(b)(2) and filing an unnecessary motion for default application instead of a substantive 
opposition appears to the Court to have been an improper tactic for harassment or unnecessary 
delay that could possibly be sanctionable under Rule 11(b).4  The Court orders Plaintiff’s counsel 
to come prepared to explain why she apparently ignored Defendants’ requests for a meet and 
 
2 It is also unclear why Defendants would have agreed to a meet and confer in mid-September when there is 
no indication they had completed their motion to dismiss.   
3 Plaintiff complains that Defendants did not schedule a meet and confer in response to her request in mid-
September.  It is unclear to the Court, however, why a meet and confer would have been appropriate at that time 
because there is no indication that Defendants had their motion to dismiss prepared for thorough discussion by then.   
4 The Court notes that this is not the first instance where the actions of Plaintiff’s counsel have been called 
into question.  Plaintiff’s counsel also filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) on the 
Morton I docket at 1 am late on a Friday night/early Saturday morning over a year after initiating the Morton I 
action and a month after filing the Complaint in the instant action.  Leaving aside the suspicious timing of the filing 
of the TRO, Plaintiff was also accused in that instance of failing to properly provide notice to Defendants as 
required by Local Rule 7-19.1 and failing to properly serve Defendants with the TRO as required by this Court’s 
standing orders.  See Morton I, Opposition to Plaintiff’s Application for Temporary Restraining Order at 3-4 n.1, 
ECF No. 68.  Defendants did not explicitly request sanctions in that instance for “Plaintiff’s abuse of the ex parte 
process,” but left the issue to the Court’s discretion.  Id. at 2.    
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confer and why she was inconsistent in her representations to the Court that Defendants had not 
made an attempt to meet and confer with her.  The Court would further ask Plaintiff’s counsel to 
come prepared to provide a justification for her refusal to file an opposition, leaving the Court 
unable to resolve the moton to dismiss on the day of the scheduled hearing.  It appears to the 
Court that the parties could have resolved the procedural issue had Plaintiff complied with Local 
Rule 7-3 or Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2) before her filings and not wasted the Court’s time and 
resources.  Plaintiff’s counsel shall explain her repeated flouting of procedural rules and use of 
tactics that appear to be causing unnecessary delay at the upcoming hearing.   
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